Dangerous Places:
The Right to Self-Defense in Prison
and Prison Conditions Jurisprudence
Anders Kayet
The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.
Attributed to Fyodor Dostoevsky'
Prisons are dangerous places.
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook2
The political character of judicial decisions can be disguised
by claims that these decisions are compelled by the logic of the
law. A recent decision depriving Indiana prisoners of their right
to self-defense illustrates the important role this ruse plays in
current prison conditions jurisprudence.
After days of threatening sexual innuendo, Indiana Reformatory prisoner Michael Evans attempted to rape cellblock neighbor
John Rowe. Rowe responded by hitting Evans with a hot-pot and
calling for help.3 Prison officials found that Rowe had violated
prison rules by committing battery,4 and imposed as a punishment one year in disciplinary segregation.5 Rowe was not allowed to plead self-defense. In Rowe v DeBruyn, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the outcome of the prison hearing, concluding that
prisoners may be denied the right to defend themselves against

t A-B. 1991, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of Chicago.
' Suzy Platt, ed, Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of QuotationsRequested from the
CongressionalResearch Service 286 (Library of Congress 1989).
2 McGill v Duckworth, 944 F2d 344, 345 (7th Cir 1991). Justice Thomas recently
affirmed this description, writing that "prisons are necessarily dangerous places ...
Farmerv Brennan, 114 S Ct 1970, 1990 (1994), citing McGill, 944 F2d at 348.
' Rowe v DeBruyn, 17 F3d 1047, 1049 (7th Cir 1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct 508
(1994).
Id at 1048-49.
' In the end, the penalty was suspended. Id at 1049.
The prison officials did, however, consider self-defense a mitigating factor in sentencing Rowe. Id at 1049.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[63:693

violent attacks by other prisoners.7 As a result, prisoners in the
Indiana penal system must now submit to violence, even rape, or
suffer potentially severe and recurrent punishment for their acts
of self-defense.
This Comment argues that prisoners have a constitutional
right to self-defense. The Rowe decision epitomizes the worst in
prison conditions jurisprudence, ignoring important constitutional
doctrines and unnecessarily imperiling prisoners. Section I illustrates the importance of the right to self-defense in the prison
context, where violence is ubiquitous, and demonstrates that
traditional prison conditions jurisprudence offers little promise of
protection. Section II reviews the constitutional jurisprudence
regarding self-defense, finding it to be both ambiguous and underdeveloped. Section III argues that there are at least two
grounds for finding that prisoners have a constitutional right to
self-defense. First, because self-defense has been an indispensable element of Anglo-American criminal justice, it is a fundamental right within the doctrine of due process. Second, the law
governing the due process rights of the institutionalized, properly
understood, mandates that when the state fails to protect prisoners, they must be allowed to protect themselves.
This Comment concludes that the decision in Rowe reflects
not the logic of the law, but an inhumane conception of prisoners'
rights. Judges often observe that "prisons are dangerous places,"
as though this were positive fact. Rowe reveals the fallacy in
such an analysis. Judges often determine the conditions of prison
life. If prisons are dangerous places, it is, at least in part, because judges make them so.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IN THE PRISON CONTEXT
It has long been recognized that the rule of law cannot be
absolute: there are times when lawbreaking is justified or excusable.8 Of all the justifications and excuses present in the law,

17 F3d 1047, 1052 (7th Cir 1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct 508 (1994). Specifically, the
court stated: "[Wie... consider if the right to self-defense is a fundamental constitutional
right within the Due Process Clause itself. We conclude that it is not." Id.
8 The doctrines of justification and excuse are the two most important limitations on
the reach of the criminal law. Justified conduct is conduct that under ordinary circumstances is criminal but which under the special circumstances that constitute the justification defense is not wrongful, such as when choosing the lesser of two evils, defending
another, or defending oneself. Joshua Dressier, UnderstandingCriminal Law § 16.03 at
182-83 (Matthew Bender 1987). Excused conduct is wrongful and unjustified conduct that
causes social harm but for which the actor is not held personally to blame, such as when
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none has been more fundamental than the right to self-defense.9
Although Anglo-American law has always deplored violence, for
nearly as long it has recognized that victims of unjustified attacks must be allowed to fend off their attackers, even if doing so
requires violence.'" It has been said that the self-defense instinct is so irresistible that legal prohibition would be futile, resulting only in punishment detached from culpability," and that
prohibiting self-defense under the law would undermine notions
of security that undergird civil society itself. 2 For these reasons,
the law declares that violence is wrong, but that violence as a defense against violence is justified.
The modern American prisoner is exposed to tremendous
violence. Assault, rape, and murder occur with extraordinary
frequency in prison."' Yet modern prison conditions jurisprudence fails to provide prisoners meaningful protection from each
other. This Section describes the pervasive violence encountered
by prisoners in the modern American prison and the inadequate
protection offered by current law. In this context, the right to
self-defense takes on profound importance: nowhere is the need
to defend against violence more pressing than amidst the pervasive violence and sparse protections of the modern American
prison.
A. Prisons Are Dangerous Places: The Ubiquity of Violence in
the Modern American Prison
Academic literature has documented an epidemic of prison

the actor is insane or under duress. Id.
' This Comment will not attempt to provide a precise definition of the right to selfdefense. There has been extensive debate about the scope and contours of self-defense, but
commentators agree on the core elements. Professor Robinson summarizes them neatly:
"Conduct constituting an offense is justified if (1) an aggressor unjustifiably threatens
harm to any legally-protected interest; and (2) the actor engages in conduct harmful to the
aggressor, (a) when and to the extent necessary to protect that interest, (b) that is reasonable in relation to the harm or evil threatened." Paul H. Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 131(a) at 73 (West 1984). See also Dressler, UnderstandingCriminalLaw § 17.04
at 199 (cited in note 8) ("[Dleadly force is [justified if] the actor reasonably believes that
its use is necessary to prevent imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by the aggressor."); Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 3.04 at 478 (ALI 1985) ("MPC") (Tihe
use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of
unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.").
10 See note 120 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 134-36.
12 See text accompanying notes 137-40.
13 See notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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violence. James E. Robertson calculates that the murder rate in
prison is eight times that outside of prison and that the assault
rate is at least twenty times that beyond the prison walls. 4 Michael Mushlin speculates that the incidence of homosexual rape
and sexual assault is even more disproportionate. 5 Thus, while
"no one knows for certain how much violence takes place in
American prisons since so much of it is not reported," 6 the
available evidence depicts prison as a place where violence is
ubiquitous:
[T]here are violent persons housed in our nation's prisons.
These persons, left unchecked, can make prey of weaker
inmates. The explosive mixture of personalities inherent in
any prison setting is made even more incendiary by the
overcrowding prevalent in numerous prisons, the lack of supervision and control in others, and the rising presence
of... AIDS, which makes the prospect of sexual assault
even more frightening than it already is. The result is that,
in all17 too many prisons, the risk of serious violence is pervasive.

Thus, writes Robertson, "a reign of inmate terror has descended
upon many prisons." s
The ubiquity of prison violence demonstrates its crucial role
in prison social and institutional dynamics. One author observes
that there are several powerful incentives for violence in the
prison context:
[iolence... (1) provides a reputation for violence that in
itself becomes a deterrent against victimization; (2) improves
the self-image of the user; (3) gives sexual relief; (4) serves
as a means of extortion; (5) enhances the prospect for parole
because the staff wishes to be rid of the troublemaker. 9
Violence is also used to establish prison hierarchy: sexual
assault becomes "an act whereby one male (or a group of males)
seeks testimony to what he considers is an outward validation of

'" James E. Robertson, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An Analysis of the
Rights ofProtective Custody Inmates, 56 U Cin L Rev 91, 93-94 (1987).
" Michael B. Mushlin, 1 Rights of Prisoners§ 2.06 at 66 (Shephard's/McGraw Hill 2d
ed 1993).

16 Id.
1

Id (citations omitted).

i Robertson, 56 U Cin L Rev at 93 (cited in note 14).
" Id at 92 n 9, citing Lee H. Bowker, PrisonVictimization 31-33 (Elsevier 1981).
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his masculinity,"" and "new inmates are usually tested by predators to determine if they will resist exploitation."2 Likewise,
violence is an outlet for racial tension; indeed, "racial conflict, including extreme violence and riots, is the reality of institutional
life in prisons around the country."2 2 Finally, some speculate
that the extraordinary rate of prison violence reflects its utility in
maintaining prison order:
[Aictions of prison officials make homosexual rape easier to
commit. They do not discourage it because rape "facilitates
greater control over the inmates[,] ...divides the prisoners ...[and] gives them real cause to suspect, fear, fight,
and hate each other."'
Commentators have paid special attention to the gruesome
form of violence threatened in Rowe: prison rape. It is now well
established that prisoner-on-prisoner rape is a widespread form
of prison violence.24 One observer has written that "[s]exual assault appears to be as common in American prisons as iron
bars." ' Another estimates that "of the forty-six million Americans... who will be arrested at some time in their lives, ten million will be raped while in prison."26 And Justice Blackmun has
observed that:
A youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual
gang rape his first night in jail, or, it has been said, even in
the van on the way to jail. Weaker inmates become the property of stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell the sexual services of the victim."

Michael Graubart Levin, Fight, Flee, Submit, Sue: Alternatives for Sexually Assaulted Prisoners, 18 Colum J L & Soc Probs 505, 508-09 (1985), quoting Anthony M.
Scacco, Rape in Prison3 (C.C.Thomas 1975).
" Robertson, 56 U Cin L Rev at 92 (cited in note 14).
' Id at 92 n 11, quoting James B. Jacobs, New Perspectives on Prisons and Imprisonment 81 (Cornell 1983).
2 David M. Siegal, Note, Rape In Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth
Amendment Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 Stan L Rev 1541, 1546 (1992), quoting
Carl Weiss and David James Friar, Terror in the Prisons 27 (Bobbs-Merrill 1974).
2
Carl Weiss and David James Friar, Terror in the Prisons (Bobbs-Merrill 1974);
Robertson, 56 U Cin L Rev at 93-94 (cited in note 14).
Levin, 18 Colum J L & Soc Probs at 506 (cited in note 20).
Weiss and Friar, Terror in the Prisons at 61 (cited in note 24).
'7 United States v Bailey, 444 US 394, 421 (1980) (Blackmun dissenting) (citations

omitted).
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Victims of prison rape typically experience severe physical and
psychological injury.2" Some are killed during the assault, and
others may subsequently commit suicide. Survivors experience
the "feelings of shame suffered by anyone who is raped [as well
as].. . a 'loss of manhood,' and a shattering of their self-esteem."29 At least one judge found the psychological harm resulting from prison rape so terrible that he released the victim before
the victim's sentence had expired."0
One of the most disturbing problems posed by rape in the
prison context is the unique danger of AIDS transmission associated with this form of violence. As David M. Siegal has written:
The virus that causes this disease is transmitted rapidly
through anal intercourse, especially forceful, violent intercourse.... The combination of AIDS and rape within our
prisons thus poses a dilemma: any man sent to prison confronts, from the first moment he is incarcerated, the
Kafkaesque prospect of brutal attack by another inmate and
infection with one of the world's most deadly diseases.3 '
Another commentator has suggested that AIDS transmission in
prisons is evolving into a new form of the death penalty. 2 These
descriptions starkly illustrate what was at stake in Rowe. Had
Rowe complied with the prison policy against self-defense, he
would have risked not just the immediate physical and psychological injury associated with rape, but infection with a gruesome
and fatal disease. Yet in spite of the frightening frequency with
which this scenario arises in the prison context, the Rowe court
denied a victimized prisoner the right to resist.
The ubiquity of violence, the pervasive threat of rape, and
the potential for infection with the AIDS virus illustrate the
importance of protection from violence in the prison context, and
thus the importance of the right to self-defense. Moreover, the

Levin, 18 Colum J L & Soc Probs at 510 (cited in note 20).
Siegal, Note, 44 Stan L Rev at 1545 (cited in note 23). A newsletter prepared for
current and former prisoners by the Fortune Society, a group made up of ex-offenders, refers to prison rape as "the ultimate shame." Levin, 18 Colum J L & Soc Probs at 506-07 &
n 12 (cited in note 20), quoting How to UnderstandSexual Assaults in Prisons and Jails,
Crim Just Newsletter 2 (Apr 28, 1980).
"oPeople v Insignares, 121 Misc 2d 921, 470 NYS2d 513, 515 (Sup Ct 1983), rev'd,
109 AD2d 221, 491 NYS2d 166 (App Div 1985) (reversed on ground that trial judge
abused his discretion in dismissing the sentence).
31 Siegal, Note, 44 Stan L Rev at 1542 (cited in note 23) (citations omitted).
Ann F. Hammond, Note, AIDS in CorrectionalFacilities:A New Form of the Death
Penalty?,36 J Urban & Contemp L 167 (1989).
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prevalence of such conditions illustrates the utter failure of the
modem American prison system to provide this protection. The
next Section shows that this failure follows in large part from the
abdication of prisoner protection by modern prison conditions
jurisprudence.
B. Prison Conditions Jurisprudence and Prison Violence
The law governing prison conditions substantially relieves
prison officials of responsibility for prisoner-on-prisoner violence.
As one court recently observed: "[s]ome level of brutality and
sexual aggression among [prisoners] is inevitable no matter what
the guards do."33 Thus, "no matter how deplorable, prison conditions that are undesired [by prison officials] are not
'punishment'" and, therefore, are not subject to Eighth Amendment challenge.3 4 Such analysis is typical of modern prison conditions jurisprudence, which erects daunting hurdles for plaintiffs
in prison conditions cases. As a result, prison systems have few
legal incentives to protect prisoners from violence.
Modem prison conditions jurisprudence is grounded in the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.3 5 As early as 1890, the Supreme Court applied the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit punishments involving "torture or a lingering death."36 Still, it was not until the 1970s that the Court
recognized that "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country."37 Although it may
seem obvious that egregious prison conditions, such as rampant
prison violence, should be evaluated as potentially cruel or unusual punishment, the Supreme Court did not explicitly affirm
this connection until 1976, when it decided Estelle v Gamble.3 8
That case has given rise to a doctrine that in theory requires
"civilized" prisons, but in practice rarely punishes even the most
egregious failures to meet this standard. 9
'

McGill v Duckworth, 944 F2d 344, 348 (7th Cir 1991).

'

Id at 349.

' See Mushlin, 1 Rights of Prisoners§ 2.00 at 21-22 (cited in note 15). The Eighth
Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." US Const, Amend VIII. The Eighth Amendment is the only provision of the Bill of Rights applicable by its own terms to prisoners.
In re Kemmler, 136 US 436, 447 (1890).
Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 555-56 (1974).
429 US 97 (1976).
See Mushlin, 1 Rights of Prisoners§ 2.01 at 21-40 (cited in note 15). For an excellent analysis of the emergence of this tension and its applicability to problems of rape
and AIDS in the prison context, see generally Siegal, Note, 44 Stan L Rev 1541 (cited in
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In Estelle, a Texas prison inmate alleged that he had been
denied proper medical treatment for a back injury, and that this
denial amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.4 ° The Supreme Court concluded that
prisons have an obligation to provide medical care for inmates.4 '
In the Court's view, "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."42 From this analysis
were born the two basic and sometimes incompatible principles of
modern prison conditions jurisprudence. First, prison conditions
that unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain violate the Eighth
Amendment.' Second, such an Eighth Amendment violation
may be found only in limited circumstances-namely, when prison officials have acted with an egregiously culpable state of mind,
which the courts have defined as "deliberate indifference."4
In Wilson v Seiter, the Supreme Court extended these principles to cover a wide range of "inadequate 'conditions of confinement' 45 understood to fall short of "minimal civilized measure[s]." 46 Examples of treatment courts have held violative of
the Eighth Amendment include insufficient nourishment,4 7 failure to allow exercise,' inadequate shelter,4 9 poor sanitation,"
environmental hazards,5 ' overcrowding,5 2 and excessive use of
force by guards.5 3
Consistent with this doctrine, courts have recognized that
prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive risk of prison violence.5 4 The basic right had been recognote 23). See also Candace Ada Mueller, Note, The Evolving Standards in Prison Condition Cases: An Analysis of Wilson v. Seiter and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, 13 BC Third World L J 155 (1993).
o 429 US at 101.
41 Id at 103.
42 Id at 104, quoting Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 173 (1976).
43 Estelle, 429 US at 104. See also text accompanying notes 158-60.
"' Wilson v Seiter, 501 US 294, 297 (1991), quoting Estelle, 429 US at 104.
45 501 US 294, 303 (1991).
41 Id at 298, quoting Rhodes v Chapman, 452 US 337, 347 (1981).
4' Adams v Mathis, 458 F Supp 302, 308 (M D Ala 1978).
French v Owens, 777 F2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir 1985).
9 Henderson v DeRobertis, 940 F2d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir 1991).
o Young v Quinlan, 960 F2d 351, 363 (3d Cir 1992).
5' Helling v McKinney, 509 US 25, 35 (1993) (exposure to second-hand smoke may
violate the Eighth Amendment).
' Moore v Morgan, 922 F2d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir 1991). See also Rhodes, 452 US at
349 (holding that overcrowding must cause serious hardship before Eighth Amendment
violation arises).
Whitley v Albers, 475 US 312, 320-21 (1986).
See, for example, Farmerv Brennan, 114 S Ct 1970, 1976 (1994); Rhodes, 452 US
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nized by some lower courts even prior to Estelle.5 5 One judge,
surveying particularly horrific prison conditions, wrote that "penitentiary inmates... ought at least to be able to fall asleep at
night without fear of having their throats cut before morning,
and... the state has failed to discharge a constitutional
duty in
56
so."
do
to
them
enable
to
steps
take
to
failing
The Supreme Court also has recognized that the Eighth
Amendment provides at least some protection against prisoner
violence. As a subsequent court observed, the Court assumed in
Davidson v Cannon7 that "the prison system may not ignore
prisoners' risk of harm at the hands of other inmates."8 Similarly, in Farmer v Brennan, the Court asserted that "[b]eing
violently assaulted in prison is simply not 'part of the penalty
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'"5 9
Nevertheless, it is exceedingly difficult for prisoners to win
either prison conditions or prison violence cases. The Supreme
Court has read Estelle's deliberate indifference requirement narrowly, thereby limiting Eighth Amendment protection for prisoners. In Whitley v Albers, for example, prison guards panicked
during a riot and shot an innocent prisoner, but the Court refused to find a violation of the Eighth Amendment on the ground
that the requisite culpability had not been established: panic
could not be equated with deliberate indifference." Subsequently, in Wilson, the Court affirmed this understanding of deliberate
indifference, reasoning that since "punishment" implied a deliberately administered purpose, the Eighth Amendment is not triggered unless prison officials act with "some mental element" akin
to intent.6 ' In keeping with this emphasis on intent, the Court
at 347; Cortes-Quinonesv Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F2d 556, 558 (1st Cir 1988); Villante v
Department of Corrections,786 F2d 516, 519 (2d Cir 1986).
' See, for example, Woodhouse v Commonwealth, 487 F2d 889, 890 (4th Cir 1973) ("A
prisoner has a[n Eighth Amendment] right... to be reasonably free from the constant
threat of violence and sexual assault by his fellow inmates .... ."); Holt v Sarver, 442 F2d
304, 308 (8th Cir 1971) (holding that system of armed "trusty" inmates with supervisory
authority over other inmates, combined with "open barracks" and other dangerous conditions, violated Eighth Amendment); Roberts v Williams, 302 F Supp 972, 989 (N D Miss
1969) (holding that unprovoked shooting of inmate by "trusty" violated Eighth Amendment).
' Holt v Sarver, 300 F Supp 825, 831 (E D Ark 1969), aff 'd, 442 F2d 304 (8th Cir
1971).
11 474 US 344
(1986).

McGill, 944 F2d at 347, citing Davidson, 474 US at 350.
114 S Ct 1970, 1977 (1994), quoting Rhodes, 452 US at 347.
475 US 312, 320-21 (1986).
6' 501 US at 299-302. See also Mushlin, 1 Rights of Prisoners§ 2.01 at 27-28 (cited in

note 15).
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recently stressed that it is not enough that prison officials should
have known about horrific conditions-rather, they must actually
have known about them.6 2
Beyond the common observation that prisons are not meant
to be comfortable places, two justifications have been offered for
the use of the deliberate indifference standard. First, courts in
general have been reluctant to burden "the legitimate efforts of
the states to deal with difficult social problems."63 In the Eighth
Amendment context, judicial review has been limited by the concern that "courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to
achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system... ."" Second, courts have increasingly emphasized that
the text of the Eighth Amendment itself limits the Amendment's
reach: the Eighth Amendment regulates punishment, and punishment is by definition intentional. Thus, the Eighth Amendment, by its terms, can only apply where government officials act
with a state of mind akin to intent-that is, where the officials'
indifference may be said to be deliberate.65
This deliberate indifference standard poses a daunting obstacle for prisoners making prison conditions claims. Severe injuries
and deprivations are often caused by official behavior that does
not fit within the deliberate indifference paradigm. For example,
one commentator has noted that, under the Wilson test, budgetconstrained prison officials would not violate the Eighth Amendment even where they had full knowledge of horrible prison conditions because courts are unlikely to find that the officials deliberately imposed the conditions to magnify the inmates' punishment.66 By this reasoning, disinterested ignorance, negligence,

6

Farmer, 114 S Ct at 1979. See also McGill, 944 F2d at 351 (observing that in the

Eighth Amendment context, deliberate indifference is governed by a subjective standard
under which a prison official must actually know of or suspect a dangerous situation
before he can be deliberately indifferent to it).
Parhamv J.R., 442 US 584, 608 n 16 (1979).
Rhodes, 452 US at 352.
Wilson, 501 US at 299-302.
David J. Gottlieb, Wilson v Seiter: Less than Meets the Eye, in Ira P. Robbins, ed, 1
Prisonersand the Law 2-33, 2-37 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1992). The Supreme Court
acknowledged this possibility without distress in Wilson:
[A] state-of-mind inquiry might allow officials to interpose the defense that ...fiscal
constraints ...prevent the elimination of inhumane conditions. Even if that were so,
it is hard to understand how it could control the meaning of 'cruel and unusual
punishment' in the Eighth Amendment.
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and incompetence would be similarly valid defenses to Eighth
Amendment liability. 7
The deliberate indifference standard stands as an especially
daunting barrier to prison violence claims. When injury is caused
by a systematic failure to provide a basic necessity, as when
prisons fail to provide heat or adequate nutrition, the resulting
injuries will be widespread and traceable to policy decisions made
by prison officials. As identical injuries with identical causes
mount, prison officials' claims to ignorance of either injury or
cause become less credible and allegations of deliberate indifference become more plausible. But when injury is caused by prisoner violence, the causal connection between policy and injury becomes more obscure-an autonomous, aggressive prisoner has
interceded. Prison officials may argue that the acts of the aggressive prisoner, rather than their policy, caused the injury. Or they
may argue that they had no capacity to foresee the acts of
specific, autonomous prisoners, and thus did not know about the
risk of violence. By this line of argument, prison officials are
absolved of any general duty to try to separate more dangerous
inmates from less dangerous ones.68 Indeed, such defenses are
particularly viable where courts embrace the assumption that
some prison violence is inevitable. The more courts see prison
violence as inevitable, the less they will attribute causation to
prison officials. Thus, the deliberate indifference standard offers
prison officials numerous defenses to claims based on prisoner
violence.6 9
As a result, prison conditions doctrine allows prisons to leave
prisoners perilously vulnerable to the violence of their peers. Yet
the Rowe court concluded that a prison may lawfully punish a
prisoner for defending himself. This holding is cruel. Given the
epidemic of prison violence and the inadequacy of Eighth Amendment protections against such violence, thousands of prisoners

501 US at 301. See also McGill, 944 F2d at 349 (suggesting that prison officials should
not be found liable for prison conditions for which legislators, architects, judges, and taxpayers are all at least partly responsible).
' "It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause ... ." Wilson, 501 US at 299, quoting Whitley, 475 US at 319.
This was the argument approved of in McGill. 944 F2d at 350-53.
Not surprisingly, the practical result of these cases has been to shift the burden of
protection from prison officials to inmates. "As the opportunities for violence have expanded, and the risks of detection and punishment diminished, more responsibility has
had to be taken by the inmate to secure his own safety." Richard C. McCorkle, Personal
Precautionsto Violence in Prison, 19 Crim Just & Behav 160, 171 (1992).
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inevitably will be faced with a terrible choice: submit to assault,
rape, and perhaps infection with the AIDS virus, or suffer serious
system. It is, as one judge has written,
punishment by the prison
"a Hobson's choice." 0 The Rowe court concluded that this tragic
outcome is compelled by the Constitution. The remainder of this
Comment argues the contrary.
II. SELF-DEFENSE: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

The Rowe court viewed the law governing Rowe's claim to a
right of self-defense as clear and, therefore, disposed of his claim
in one short paragraph. The court explained that it could "find no
precedent establishing a constitutional right of self-defense in the
criminal law context,"' and that it had found one earlier case
denying the existence of such a right.7'
In fact, the law before the court was far from clear. The
Supreme Court has never directly considered the constitutional
status of self-defense. In addition, only a handful of lower courts
have considered the issue, and those courts have reached inadequately reasoned and unsatisfactory conclusions. Thus, as dissenting Judge Ripple observed in Rowe, "it is [not] hyperbole to
characterize the position of the majority as a novel one."" No
well established law required the Hobson's choice the Rowe court
imposed on prisoners.
A. Supreme Court Analysis of the Right to Self-Defense
The Supreme Court has never directly considered whether
self-defense is a constitutionally protected right. Early Supreme
Court self-defense cases were preoccupied with determining the
contours of the common law right,74 an effort the Court appears
" Griffin v Martin, 785 F2d 1172, 1187 n 37 (4th Cir), withdrawn, 795 F2d 22 (4th
Cir 1986) (en banc).
1 17 F3d at 1052. The court devoted subsequent analysis to whether a right of selfdefense, if it existed, would apply in the context of a prison disciplinary hearing, and
whether the right would outweigh legitimate penal interests. Id at 1052-53.
72 Id at 1052, citing White v Am, 788 F2d 338 (6th Gir 1986) (holding that in criminal
cases there is no constitutional right to self-defense and that a state may allocate the
burden of proof on the issue of self-defense to the defendant).
7' Rowe, 17 F3d at 1054 (Ripple dissenting).
14 In Beard v United States, for example, the Court decided that at common law a
man on his own land need not retreat from an attacker before acting in self-defense, so
long as his fears are reasonable. 158 US 550, 560 (1895). Later, in Brown v United States,
Justice Holmes broadened the reasonableness standard with the famous admonition that
"[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." 256 US
335, 343 (1921).
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to have abandoned.
Some constitutional self-defense questions have reached the
Court. Recently, these have involved the allocation of the burden
of proof when a defendant claims that he acted in self-defense. In
Martin v Ohio, the Court concluded that a state may place the
burden of proving self-defense on the defendant.75 But while
Martin addressed an important constitutional question about the
place of self-defense in a criminal trial, it did not resolve the
issue of whether self-defense is a constitutionally protected right.
Requiring defendants to prove that they acted in self-defense
(rather than forcing the state to prove that they did not) is different from withholding the defense altogether.
Indeed, the Court has long recognized that while states have
broad discretion in the allocation of burdens of proof in criminal
trials, there are limits to this discretion. In Speiser v Randall, for
example, the Court warned that:
It is of course within the power of the state to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the
burden of producing evidence... "unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and 7conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamen6
tal."
While the Court has never had occasion to apply the Speiser
principle to a self-defense case, the principle has often been noted
in other cases considering the allocation of burdens in criminal
trials.77 Section III of this Comment explores whether taking
away the right to self-defense would violate the Speiser principle.
B. Lower Court Constitutional Analysis of the Right to SelfDefense
A handful of lower courts have considered whether there is a
constitutional right to self-defense. Unfortunately, their decisions
compose an anemic body of constitutional jurisprudence. Two
cases prior to Rowe held that there is no constitutional right to

75 480 US 228, 232 (1987) (holding no violation of Due Process Clause when state requires defendant to prove affirmative defenses).
76 357 US 513, 523 (1958), quoting Snyder v Massachusetts,291 US 97, 105 (1934).
' See, for example, Pattersonv New York, 432 US 197, 210 (1977) (noting that Due
Process Clause permits states to require criminal defendants to prove affirmative defens-

es, but that "It]here are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the states may not
go" in relabeling the elements of its crimes).
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self-defense.78 However, these decisions exhibit both a cursory
consideration of the issue and a failure to invoke significant supporting authority. In contrast, two judges have speculated-one
in dictum and one in dissent-that the right to self-defense must
necessarily be guaranteed in the Constitution.7 9 Here too, the
arguments are cursory and unsupported.
1. Cases denying that there is a constitutional right to selfdefense.
The first case to deny that the Constitution guarantees a
0
right to self-defense was Fields v Harris."
Following her termination for assaulting a coworker, Fields brought a wrongful discharge claim to a federal employment review board.8 After her
claim was rejected by the review board, Fields appealed to federal court, where she argued that she had acted in self-defense and
that the dismissal therefore violated her constitutional rights. 2
Rejecting her claim, the Fields court concluded that self-defense
is "not a "substantive
right conferred directly by the federal Constitution. '3
The discussion of the constitutional question in Fields is
thin: two short sentences. The court cited no authority-statutory, common law, academic, or otherwise-in support of
its holding. Rather, the court suggested that the constitutional
argument was not a serious one, but merely "an effort to circumvent [a] statutory time bar and establish jurisdiction."' Hence,
while the Fields court rejected the constitutional claim in this
procedural posture, the opinion does not purport to dispose of the
issue of whether there is a constitutional right to self-defense.

78 See Fields v Harris,675 F2d 219 (8th Cir 1982); White v Am, 788 F2d 338 (6th Cir

1986).
7 See Griffin v Martin, 785 F2d 1172 (4th Cir 1986); Isaac v Engle, 646 F2d 1129
(6th Cir 1980) (Merritt dissenting on other grounds).
675 F2d 219, 220 (8th Cir 1982).
81 Id at 219-20.
Id at 220.
Id. Fields had attempted to ground this right in the Second, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendments. Id.
' Fields was appealing an adverse ruling by the United States Civil Service Commission, review of which must be filed with the Court of Claims or a Court of Appeals within
thirty days. Her constitutional claim was apparently an effort to get into court after the
thirty-day period had lapsed. (The court did not comment on whether this ruse would
have worked had her constitutional claim been valid.) Id, citing Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978, 5 USC § 7703(b)(1) (Supp 1978).
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The other case cited for the proposition that self-defense is
not a constitutional right is White v Am. 8" There, the state
placed the burden of proving self-defense on a criminal defendant. Anticipating the ruling in Martin, the White court rejected
the claim that this burden allocation was unconstitutional. 86
Unlike the plaintiff in Martin, however, White also argued that
"there is a constitutional right of self-defense, founded in the
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, which an accused
cannot be required to prove.""7 The White court responded that
this argument was foreclosed by the burden allocation analysis of
earlier Supreme Court cases: "[T]o hold that self-defense is a constitutional right which a defendant cannot constitutionally be required to prove, would be to reject the Supreme Court's established analysis .... "~88
White, like Fields, is weak authority for the proposition that
there is no constitutional right to self-defense. Like the Fields
court, the White court did not cite a single authority regarding
the constitutional status of self-defense. More significantly, although Rowe suggests that White held there is no constitutional
right to self-defense,8 9 this is a mischaracterization of White. In
fact, the White court rejected only the proposition that the right
to self-defense was constitutionally protected in a way that had
bearing on the allocation of the burden of proof.90 Indeed, White
expressly reserved the broader question whether the right to selfdefense exists at all: "This holding does not reject the notion that
a defendant has a limited right to act in self-defense under certain circumstances."9 ' Therefore, neither White nor Fields is reliable authority regarding the constitutional status of the right to
self-defense.

- 788 F2d 338 (6th Cir 1986).
Id at 343-47.
Id at 347.
Id, citing Patterson v New York, 432 US 197 (1977). Patterson had held that the
prosecution in a criminal case is not constitutionally required to prove the nonexistence of
all affirmative defenses, and that states may therefore allocate the burden of proving affirmative defenses to the defendant. 432 US at 208-09.
Rowe, 17 F3d at 1052.
'o White, 788 F2d at 347.
9' Id at 347 n 15. The court specifically limited its holding to the burden of proof
issue: "Our holding simply embodies a determination that Ohio's allocation of the burden
of proving self-defense does not violate the Due Process Clause." Id.
8
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2. Judges arguing that there is a constitutional right to selfdefense.
While no court has held that there is a constitutional right to
self-defense, at least two judges prior to Rowe argued that the
Constitution must incorporate such a right. Judge Merritt first
advanced this position in a brief dissent in Isaac v Engle.9 2 Like
White, Isaac was one of numerous pre-Martin cases considering
the burden-of-proof issue; the Isaac majority concluded that because Ohio had, by statute, effectively made the absence of affirmative defenses an element of the crimes in question, the burden
of proving self-defense could not be placed on the defendant. 3
Dissenting on procedural grounds, Judge Merritt nevertheless
took special care to argue that self-defense is a constitutional
right:
I believe the Constitution prohibits a state from eliminating
the justification of self-defense from its criminal law and requires the state to prove as an element of the crimes of assault and homicide that no such self-defense justification
exists.94
In Griffin v Martin,95 Judge Murnaghan reached a similar
conclusion in dicta. The issue in Griffin was whether trial instructions on the burden of proof issue were so contradictory and
misleading as to be unconstitutional. The appellate court held
that the instructions were unconstitutional and found for the
defendant.9 6 Murnaghan's opinion, however, went beyond the
scope of the case to discuss the constitutional status of the right
to self-defense. In a footnote, he reasoned that, because self-defense is a complete exoneration, its absence must be regarded as
an element of a crime; accordingly, defendants should not bear
the burden of proof on this issue. 7 Judge Murnaghan also stated that:

646 F2d 1129, 1140 (6th Cir 1980) (Merritt dissenting on other grounds).
g Id at 1134-35. The majority contended that placing the burden of proof on the
defendant would be inconsistent with In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364 (1970) (holding that
due process requires prosecution to prove "every fact necessary to constitute the crime").
Isaac, 646 F2d at 1140 (Merritt dissenting on other grounds).
5 785 F2d 1172 (4th Cir 1986), withdrawn upon rehearing en banc, 795 F2d 22
(1986).
Id at 1173.
Id at 1187 n 37. The dissent rejected Judge Murnaghan's reasoning. See id at 1194
(Sneeden dissenting).
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It is difficult to the point of impossibility to imagine a right
in any state to abolish self-defense altogether, thereby leaving one a Hobson's choice of almost certain death through
violent attack now or statutorily mandated death through
trial and conviction of murder later."
Given this sparse and inconsistent body of law, it is not surprising that one federal court recently observed in dicta (without
referring to Rowe, Fields, White, Isaac, or Griffin) that the constitutionality of the right to self-defense would "present an important question."99 Neither the Supreme Court cases nor the decisions and dicta in the lower courts employ satisfactory analysis
of, or invoke significant authority regarding, the constitutional
status of the right to self-defense. Rather, current law comprises
a disconnected array of unsupported decisions and musings-a
sad basis for a decision with the ramifications of Rowe. The next
Section demonstrates that the Constitution offers fertile ground
for a more compassionate approach.
Im. THE PRISONER'S RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE AND JUDICIAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRISON CONDITIONS CONTEXT

A manual for jailhouse lawyers informs prisoners: "It is virtually certain that you retain your right of self-defense if attacked by a fellow inmate.. . ."" Contrary to the arguments in
Rowe, the logic of the law does not compel the conclusion that
prisoners must submit to violence. Rather, as this Section demonstrates, the Due Process Clause supports a right to self-defense.'' First, it has long been held that due process protects

Griffin, 785 F2d at 1187 n 37.
9 Jackson v Senkowski, 817 F Supp 6, 7 (S D NY 1993). The Jackson court indicated
it would ground the right to self-defense in due process:
One might well be deprived of liberty without due process if incarcerated for at....All states appear to recognize a defense of self-detempting to defend one's life
fense [and] security of the person is an obvious component of the domestic Tranquillity [sic] which was one of the original objectives of the Constitution.
"®Barret L. Brick, The Right to be Freefrom Assault, 16 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 347,
381 (1985), citing United States v Stahls, 194 F Supp 849 (SD Ind 1961), and State v
Boyd, 498 SW2d 532 (Mo 1973) (no mention of whether the right has a constitutional
dimension).
..
1 The Fifth Amendment, which is binding on the federal government, provides: 'No
person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..."
US Const, Amend V. Nearly identical language in the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
the same restriction on the states: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life,
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those rights essential to the Anglo-American conception of criminal justice, and self-defense is such a right. 2 Second, even if
there is not a general right to self-defense, an emerging strand of
due process doctrine supports the argument that the state must
either protect institutionalized individuals, or allow them to protect themselves."3 This Comment concludes that failure to recognize the right of self-defense is not only unconstitutional, but
also a disturbing abdication of judicial responsibility.
A. Self-Defense as a Fundamental Right in Anglo-American
Criminal Justice
In Speiser, the Supreme Court warned that while states may
place heavy burdens of proof on criminal defendants, they may
not do so if in so doing they "offend[ ] some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked fundamental."'O' Courts have long recognized that certain rights are so essential to the Anglo-American system of
criminal justice that, although they are nowhere explicitly enumerated, they are nevertheless guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause. Whether entrenched in the common law or recognized as
part of our history, these rights have been called "fundamental"0 5 and necessary to "ordered liberty."' 6 No right recognized within this doctrine, however, has been more entrenched in
the common law, nor more universally recognized, than the right
to self-defense.
1. The doctrine of fundamental rights.
In Palko v Connecticut, the Supreme Court described the
class of rights protected by constitutional due process as those
rights without which "neither liberty nor justice would exist"; of
which "a pervasive recognition ... can be traced in our history,

liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ." US Const, Amend XIV. The requirements of these two provisions have apparently converged in the criminal context. "[The
Supreme] Court has 'increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the [Bill of Rights]
to determine whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law.'"
Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784, 794 (1969) (citation omitted).
10 See text accompanying notes 104-09.
103 See text accompanying notes 164-69.
357 US at 523, quoting Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 (1934).
Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 328 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v
Maryland, 395 US 784, 794 (1969); Speiser, 357 US at 523, quoting Snyder, 291 US at
105.
10 Palko, 302 US at 325.
105
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political and legal"; and the violation of which would be "so acute
and shocking that our polity will not endure it.""7 In short, constitutional due process protects "those 'fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."" 8 In Moore v City of East Cleveland, the
Court described such rights as those
that are "deeply rooted in
19
this Nation's history and tradition.

0

These standards remain controversial. Their vague terms
offer courts little guidance when confronted with specific rights.
Thus, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to guarantee rights
under Palko, Moore, and their progeny: "the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and
open-ended.""0 Yet time and again, the Supreme Court has determined that certain rights, not elaborated in the text of the
Constitution, are nevertheless inherent in the constitutional conception of due process."'

107
108

302 US 319, 326-28 (1937).
Id at 328, quoting Hebert v Louisiana, 272 US 312, 316 (1926). The discussion in

Palko was confined to rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The Court stated that
some, like free speech, are fundamental (and therefore binding on the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment), and held that double jeopardy is among those that are not. Id at
328. The holding as to double jeopardy was later overruled by Benton v Maryland,395 US
784, 794 (1969). The idea of fundamental rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
was, consistent with the quoted language from Palko, later applied to other,
nonenumerated rights. See, for example, Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 498
(1977) (right to count grandsons as part of a "single family" for zoning purposes); Griswold
v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 496 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Shapiro v Thompson, 394
US 618, 627 (1969) (right to interstate travel).
Other courts have used language different from Palko to convey the notion of fundamental rights. For example, in Rochin v California,the Court stated that substantive due
process is violated by state actions which "offend those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses. These standards of justice are not formulated
anywhere as though they were specifics." 342 US 165, 169 (1952) (citation omitted).
109 431 US 494, 503 (1977).
0 Collins v HarkerHeights, 503 US 115, 125 (1992). Justice Black expressed the core
concern in dissent in In re Winship: "When this Court assumes for itself the power to
declare any law-state or federal-unconstitutional because it offends the majority's own
views of what is fundamental and decent in our society, our Nation ceases to be governed
according to 'the law of the land' and instead becomes one governed by the 'law of the
judges.'" 397 US 358, 384 (1970) (Black dissenting).
m"See, for example, Mooney v Holohan, 294 US 103, 110-12 (1935) (Knowing use of
perjury by a prosecutor inconsistent with constitutional due process.); Napue v Illinois,
360 US 264, 269 (1959) (Failure of the prosecution to correct known, false testimony
violates due process.); Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963) (Prosecutorial suppression
of favorable, material evidence requested by defendant violates due process.); Giglio v
United States, 405 US 150, 152-54 (1972) (Failure of the prosecutor to disclose agreements
with witnesses violates due process.).
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The most famous inherent rights case, In re Winship,"
provides some guidance in identifying what constitutes an inherent right. There, the Court held that the reasonable-doubt standard in criminal trials is protected by constitutional due process."' According to the Winship Court, such a right is
indispensable in "a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual""' and is a "historically grounded
right[ ] of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious
and unjust convictions."" 5 To this end, the Court focused on
two factors. First, the Court emphasized that the reasonabledoubt standard had long been recognized in Anglo-American
criminal justice: "The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge
be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least
from our early years as a Nation. The 'demand for a higher degree of persuasion ...was recurrently expressed from ancient
times .... ,,s Second, the Court stressed that the reasonable
doubt standard was recognized in nearly every contemporary
common-law jurisdiction. According to the Court: "Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in
common law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a
requirement of due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced
and justice administered.'"" 7 Thus, the decision in Winship
turned on the historical entrenchment and universal acceptance
of the reasonable-doubt standard."'
While the doctrine of inherent rights is notoriously vague,
the more concrete standards of historical entrenchment and universal recognition provide a reliable foundation for identifying
fundamental rights. Moreover, legal analysis that derives the
meaning of due process from consensus that cuts across time and
place has the salutary effect of minimizing the potential for
Under the above standards,
abuse of judicial discretion."
courts should consider the right to self-defense to be inherent in
due process, for it has been affirmed by a consensus that spans

397 US 358 (1970).
113
114
115
16

Id at 364.

Id at 363-64.
Id at 362-64, quoting Davis v United States, 160 US 469, 488 (1895).
Id at 361, quoting Charles T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 321

at 681-82 (West 1954).
1
Id at 361-62, quoting Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 155 (1968).
m See also Albright v Oliver, 114 S Ct 807, 825 (1994) (Stevens dissenting) ("In In re
Winship, [the Court's holding] relied on history and certain societal interests ...
19 See note 110.
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several hundred years of common law and every modern common
law jurisdiction.
2. Self-defense as essential to the Anglo-American system of
criminal justice.
Some conception of the right to self-defense is as fundamental to the Anglo-American conception of criminal justice as any of
the rights affirmed in the line of cases stretching from Palko to
Winship to the present. As a brief survey of its history shows, the
lineage of self-defense rivals that of the reasonable-doubt standard. Likewise, the right is almost universally recognized today.
The right to self-defense has been entrenched in the English
system of criminal justice since the decline of the Saxons." As
early as the thirteenth century, prototypical conceptions of justification and excuse were emerging in criminal law, and the right
to self-defense began to take form.'" At first, the right was recognized in only limited circumstances. Killings committed to prevent crimes or to filfili a lawfully mandated punishment became
lawful, but only because they were considered an implementation
of the state's interest in a safe and secure society." As one
commentator explains, "[alt early common law, justification defenses [including self-defense] had a strong public-benefit cast.
Conduct was... justified [when] it was performed in the public's
interest."'

' In Anglo-Saxon law prior to the nineteenth century, self-defense was viewed as a
mitigating factor-and often the basis for a pardon-rather than a complete justification
for homicide. Dolores A. Donovan and Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man
Obsolete? A CriticalPerspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loyola LA L Rev 435,
442 (1981). As one commentator suggests, the provisions of Saxon law were geared to
maximize the power of the ruling class: "Prohibition of any form of self-help allowed early
English rulers to control violence and establish obedience to the rule of law." Cathryn Jo
Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on the Behalf of
Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am U L Rev 11, 25 (1986). The Anglo-Saxon reluctance to
allow self-help gave way between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries to the concept of
justifiable homicide, which was rooted in the theory that such killings were done on behalf
of the state and benefitted society. Id at 25.
"2' Garrett Epps, Any Which Way But Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes
Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American "RetreatRule", 55 L & Contemp
Probs 303, 307-08 (1992).
'" Rosen, 36 Am U L Rev at 25-26 (cited in note 120). See also Dressier, Understanding CriminalLaw § 16.03 at 182-83 (cited in note 8).
"2 Dressier, UnderstandingCriminal Law § 17.02 at 187 (cited in note 8). See also
Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684, 692 (1975) ("At early common law only those homicides
committed in the enforcement of justice were considered justifiable ..
").
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An alternative understanding of self-defense began to take
form in the medieval common law courts. Some came to recognize
the right to self-defense as essential to a fair system of criminal
justice. Courts observed that acts of self-defense often arose irresistibly from human instinct, and that punishment of such acts
would distort the calibration of punishment to culpability. "A
medieval English defendant who acted in self-defense was probably presumed to have had no real choice whether to act because
of the natural human instinct for self-preservation-an instinct
inconsistent with the need for social control."'
By the seventeenth century, the concept of self-defense had
matured and was well established. 2 ' The original social-control
account of self-defense had given rise to a more general understanding that acts of self-defense were "justified" because they
contributed to the social order." Kant, for example, believed
that "Is]elf-defense [had] to be understood exclusively as an institution designed to secure the Right, the framework securing the
maximum freedom of all." 7
The early conception of self-defense as an irresistible instinct
had also taken hold. By the eighteenth century, it was widely
recognized that, because the self-defense reaction was irresistible,
it was not blameworthy; in legal terms, it became an "excuse"
from punishment.' On this basis, Blackstone declared self-defense a fundamental individual right. In his view, the common
law "respect[ed] the passions of the human mind."" Killing in
self-defense was "excusable from the great universal principle of
self-preservation, which prompts every man to save his own life
preferably to that of another."3 ° Indeed, Blackstone maintained
that society could not take away the right: "Self-defense... is
justly called the primary law of nature, [and therefore] it is not,
neither can it be ... taken away by the law of society."' 3 '
Rosen, 36 Am U L Rev at 26 (cited in note 120).
Mullaney, 421 US at 692.
"' For a discussion of self-defense as a justification, see George P. Fletcher, Re'

thinking CriminalLaw § 10.5 at 857-64 (Little, Brown 1978).
" George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 Colum L Rev 533,
551 (1987), citing Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 331-37 (BobbsMerrill 1965) (J. Ladd, trans).
" For a discussion of self-defense as an excuse, see Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal
Law § 10.5 at 856 (cited in note 126).
" Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 18.05 at 208 (cited in note 8), quoting
William M. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *3.
Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 18.05 at 208 (cited in note 8), quoting
William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *186.
...Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *4 (cited in note 129).
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From these early principles, several modern justifications for
the right to self-defense have emerged. Some contemporary theories are rooted in the early understanding of the relationship
between self-defense and a stable social order. One utilitarian
justification, for example, holds that when choosing between
aggressors and victims, the law should favor victims as a class
because they are and will be less destructive to society than ag3 2 Another common argument is that
gressors."
giving victims
the right to act violently against aggressors will reduce the overall level of violence in society: aggressors will be deterred by the
threat of defensive violence, and the violence deterred will more
than counterbalance the violence resulting from self-defense.'
Most modern scholars, however, follow Blackstone's argument that the self-defense reaction is irresistible and therefore
not blameworthy. They echo Blackstone's assertion that no fair
system of criminal law can remove so natural an impulse as selfdefense."M For example, according to Professor Fletcher, self-defense "has its origins in the common-sense view that a person
sometimes has 'no choice' but to kill his adversary .... [T]he
human response is to kill rather than be killed."3 5 The excuse
of self-defense is therefore necessary to the proper calibration of
punishment to culpability: it is "our way of making the moral
claim that [the defender] is not to be blamed for the kind of
choice that other people would make under the same circumstances."'36

" Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 18.05 at 208 (cited in note 8). See also
Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 Cal L
Rev 871, 882 (1976). A similar conclusion is sometimes reached in "principled" or
deontological moral argument, where it is said that the victim's claim to safety and life is
'superior" to that of the aggressor. Dressier, UnderstandingCriminalLaw § 18.05 at 210
(cited in note 8). Another common argument from moral principle is that the high value of
personal autonomy authorizes victims to protect that autonomy even by violence against
encroachers. Here again the arguments echo the early "social good" justifications. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 10.5.3 at 860-61 (cited in note 126). See also Robinson, 2
Criminal Law Defenses § 131(a) at 70 (cited in note 9).
" Kadish, 64 Cal L Rev at 882-83 (cited in note 132); Dressier, UnderstandingCriminal Law § 18.05 at 209 (cited in note 8).
1
The crudest version of this account asserts that unlawful attackers forfeit their
right to legal protection, at least while engaged in the unlawful attack, because their
interests are "discounted... by the degree of [their] culpability." Fletcher, Rethinking
Criminal Law § 10.5.2 at 858 (cited in note 126). See also Kadish, 64 Cal L Rev at 882
(cited in note 132) (observing that "on the balance of utilities it is better ...that it be the
attacker [who dies] rather than his victim").
13
Fletcher, Rethinking CriminalLaw § 10.5.1 at 856 (cited in note 126).
1'
Id. See also Rosen, 36 Am U L Rev at 27 (cited in note 120) (The "intentional infliction of physical harm upon another is not culpable when it is inflicted in self-defense.").

716
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Similarly, many modern scholars echo Blackstone's assertion
that the right to self-defense is so essential to justice that it cannot be denied by the state. According to Professor Kadish, "[t]he
individual does not surrender his fundamental freedom to preserve himself against aggression by the establishment of state
authority .... [It is a] moral right against the state....""
Kadish concludes that "[t]he answer is unambiguous in every
legal system: the victim may kill to save his own life."'3 8
Dressler makes a similar argument:
[T]he innocent person may have a right against the government to kill the aggressor. The thesis is that people band
together to create a legal system in order to protect
themselves against various forms of aggression. Every person has a right, therefore, to the law's protection against
aggression; when the law fails to provide protection, the
threatened person has a right to resist the aggression." 9
Finally, Fletcher observes that "there are few legal ideas as basic
as the principle of legitimate self-defense ....
Th[is] principle is
so deeply ingrained in our legal thinking that it is difficult to
imagine a legal system that did not acknowledge it."'
Every modern American jurisdiction recognizes, in some
form, the right to self-defense.' All states now have statutory
provisions establishing a form of the right to self-defense in the
general population.
Similarly, state courts have consistently
recognized some form of the common law right to self-de-

"' Kadish, 64 Cal L Rev at 885 (cited in note 132). See also Fletcher, Rethinking
CriminalLaw § 10.5.4 at 867 (cited in note 126) ("According to this view of necessary defense, the private use of force is tolerated... because the state fails in its task of providing protection against aggression.").
"
Kadish, 64 Cal L Rev at 881 (cited in note 132).
Dressier, UnderstandingCriminalLaw § 18.04 at 201 (cited in note 8).
1
George P. Fletcher, Self-Defense as a Justificationfor Punishment, 12 Cardozo L
Rev 859, 859 (1991). Fletcher notes that even in legal systems that do not embrace our
conception of rights, such as the system elaborated in the Talmud, "self-defense and
defense of others emerge... as central and unquestioned aspects of legal life." Id. For an
interesting counter to these traditional arguments, see Epps, 55 L & Contemp Probs 303,
304 (cited in note 121) (positing that "pure" self-defense is rare-and therefore not a useful concept-because most homicides occur following ambiguous confrontations between
persons who know each other and have conflicted before).
..
' Robinson, 2 CriminalLaw Defenses § 132 at 96 n 1 (cited in note 9) (citing statutory and/or case law recognition of the right to self-defense in "every American jurisdiction").
"2 Id (listing self-defense statutes in every state).

1996]

DangerousPlaces

fense."

So too have federal courts, including the Supreme

Court.'"

Thus, while it may seem striking that only a few courts have
ever considered the constitutional nature of the right to self-defense, the dearth of case law actually attests to the universal
acceptance of the right. Because states and courts have always
permitted claims of self-defense, the constitutional foundation of
this prerogative has rarely ever been at issue. In Winship, the
Court paid special note to similar circumstances. As Justice
Harlan explained:
It is only because of the nearly complete and long-standing
acceptance of the reasonable doubt standard by the states in
criminal trials that the Court has not before today had to
hold explicitly that due process, as an expression of fundamental procedural fairness, requires [the reasonable doubt
standard].. .. '
Consideration of the constitutionality of the right to self-defense
has been foreclosed in much the same way."
In sum, the right to self-defense clearly meets the standards
established in Speiser, Palko, and Winship. Like the right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to self-defense has
been entrenched in the Anglo-American system of criminal justice for several centuries. Similarly, and again like the right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to self-defense is now
accorded near universal recognition in common law jurisdictions.
Indeed, the theories underlying the right suggest that it is
indispensable to the calibration of punishment and culpability
and that a legal system without a right to self-defense could not
achieve justice.

143

Id.

'" See, for example, Brown v United States, 256 US 335, 343 (1921) (recognizing right
to use deadly force against an attacker if grievous harm reasonably believed imminent);
Smith v Lauritzen, 356 F2d 171, 176 (3d Cir 1966) (same).
'" 397 US at 372 (Harlan concurring) (citation omitted).
141 Indeed, courts have occasionally recognized that the question of the constitutionality of the right to self-defense might never arise. The majority in Griffin recognized that
"[tihe question is not presented in Griffin's case, and is unlikely to arise." 785 F2d at
1186.
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B. Self-Defense as a Due Process Right of the Institutionalized
While the doctrine of inherent rights provides a basis for
finding that prisoners have a right to self-defense, it is not the
only basis. The prisoner's right to self-defense may also be
grounded on a narrower rationale, one that emerges at the intersection of the law governing the due process rights of the institutionalized in general and the law of necessity in the prison context.
The Due Process Clause places substantive limits on the
conditions to which the institutionalized may be exposed. Specifically, their "basic human needs" must be met. 47 But there is a
problem with this doctrine. In deference to the difficulties faced
by state-run institutions, courts have injected a culpability requirement into the due process analysis, transforming seemingly
absolute limits on the conditions of institutionalization into frail
and contingent protections.' This Section demonstrates that
recognizing a necessity defense within the due process doctrine
governing the rights of the institutionalized mitigates this problem by reinforcing certain basic rights without unduly burdening
state institutions. From this necessity defense arises a prisoner's
right to self-defense.
1. Due process rights of the institutionalized.
The Constitution provides special protection to those the
state institutionalizes against their will. According to a line of
cases culminating in DeShaney v Winnebago County Department
of Social Services," due process requires that institutions provide food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety to
the institutionalized. 5 0 While the Court in DeShaney recognized that "nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause
itself requires the state to protect the life, liberty, and property of
its citizens,"'
it also held that due process requirements

1

See DeShaney v Winnebago County Departmentof Social Services, 489 US 189, 200

(1989).
See text accompanying notes 158-59.
m 489 US 189 (1989).
"
Id at 200. DeShaney traced this principle to Youngberg v Romeo, 457 US 307, 31516 (1982). Youngberg involved inmates in a state-run mental hospital. The Court there
held that substantive due process requires the state to assure the reasonable safety of
involuntarily committed mental patients. Id. See also Revere v Massachusetts General
Hospital, 463 US 239, 244 (1983) (holding that due process requires provision of medical
care to injured suspects in police custody).
"' 489 US at 195.
'4
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change dramatically when the state institutionalizes an individual.'52 The Due Process Clause is phrased as a limitation on the
state's power to act, and incarceration is state action. Thus, "it is
the state's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom
to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is
the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due
Process Clause .... 11153
As the Court has repeatedly recognized, these due process
protections require the state to assure that the basic human
needs of those it incarcerates are met. As the Court held in
DeShaney:

[If] the state.., so restrains an individual's liberty that it
renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time
fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by... the
Due Process Clause.' M
In Youngberg v Romeo, a case involving patients committed to a
state-run mental hospital, the Court identified "adequate food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care" as the "essentials of the care
that the State must provide."'55 The Court also declared that
the state "has the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety
for all residents and personnel within the institution."'56
The principle that institutionalized individuals must be assured such basic necessities as food, shelter, and protection from
violence serves an important purpose. The absence of such assurance would allow states to render the institutionalized helpless,
then forswear responsibility for injuries, even death, suffered by
these individuals. Furthermore, this understanding of due process resolves some of the most disturbing hypotheticals posed by
critics of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence." 7 For example, the
Eighth Amendment allows petty thieves to starve, freeze, or be
raped when prison officials are handcuffed by budgetary constraints, so long as such conditions do not result from deliberate
indifference or intentional punishment. Fortunately, starving
2 Id at 199-200.
1'
154

Id at 200.
Id.

"' 457 US 307, 324 (1982).

15 Id.
157 See text accompanying note 66.
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thieves have other constitutional recourse-the Due Process
Clause.
While the due process principles articulated in DeShaney and
Youngberg seem to establish firm limits on the conditions to
which the institutionalized may be exposed, these limits are
undermined by the injection of a culpability element into the due
process analysis. Specifically, under Youngberg, courts must defer
to the decisions of institutional officials regarding conditions of
confinement in all cases where the decisions are made in good
faith.'5 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that the particularly daunting deliberate indifference standard applied to the
Eighth Amendment should be applied to due process analysis in
the prison context.'59 However, as in the Eighth Amendment
context, the injection of the culpability requirement into due
process analysis undermines constitutional safeguards, and
transforms the substantive limits of due process into unreliable,
contingent protections.
Courts justify the culpability requirement in due process
analysis by concerns that are similar to, but crucially distinct
from, those invoked in the Eighth Amendment context. As in the
Eighth Amendment context, courts are reluctant to impose onerous constitutional burdens on state institutions. 6 ' Courts recognize that such institutions face challenging social problems on
limited budgets. The requirement of deference to decisions made
in good faith serves to shield institutions from liability for their
honest mistakes as they struggle to allocate their limited resources appropriately. Often, however, this means that state institutions escape liability for even the most deplorable conditions
unless they act with a culpable mental state.
Although the text of the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted as necessarily including an intent requirement (since
1

457 US at 324.

159 "[We suggested that [deliberate indifference] is required to make out a substantive

due process claim in the prison setting." DeShaney, 489 US at 199 n 5, citing Whitley, 475
US at 326-27 (holding that Due Process Clause affords inmate no greater protection than
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
160 See, for example, Parham v J.R., 442 US 584, 608 n 16 (1979) (procedures for
commitment to state mental hospitals); Youngberg, 457 US at 324 (care and safety of
committed mental patients); Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 556 (1974) (prison disciplinary proceedings). See also text accompanying notes 60-65. Indeed, this may have been
what the Rowe court was really getting at. Having held that there is no constitutional
right to self-defense, the Rowe court held in the alternative that even if there were such a
right, it could be overridden: 'The policy purportedly advances prison security by discouraging all physical violence among inmates .... [P]rison security and the reduction of
violence are certainly legitimate penological interests." Rowe, 17 F3d at 1053.
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"punishment" requires purposeful state action),"' no such element is textually required by the Due Process Clause.'62 Thus,
unlike the culpability requirement in the Eighth Amendment
context, the culpability element of the due process analysis is
merely a vehicle for deference to institutional decision making.
In some circumstances, however, such deference is not warranted. The following Section demonstrates that a limited defense of necessity can and should be recognized as a central component of the due process rights of the institutionalized. Recognition of such a defense would revitalize DeShaney's substantive
limitations without unduly burdening state institutions. From
this limited necessity defense arises a prisoner's right to self-defense.
2. Institutionalization, necessity, and self-defense.
The law governing the due process rights of the institutionalized typically addresses institutional conditions by placing obligations on the state. The institutionalized must be fed, sheltered,
and protected, for example. Because these obligations can be so
costly, good-faith institutional decisions regarding their fulfillment are protected by the culpability element of the due process
analysis. What some courts fail to recognize, however, is that the
institutionalized also have rights that do not place corresponding
obligations on the state; institutional actions and decisions affecting these rights should not be shielded in the same way. The
right to necessary acts of survival is such a right. This right provides a basis for a constitutional right to self-defense in the prison context.
Necessity is a longstanding defense to criminal liability. It is
properly invoked by one who has broken a law, but did so because lawbreaking was necessary to avoid a greater evil. Most
commonly, necessity is claimed where the lawbreaker's life depended on the lawbreaking. While there is no universally accepted definition of necessity, its basic elements are widely agreed
upon: "[c]onduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil... is justifiable, provided that.., the harm or evil
sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought
to be prevented by the law [broken]."'
161
16

See text accompanying notes 61-62.
For the texts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, see

note 101.
1
MPC § 3.02(1). See also Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 17.02 at 183
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Recognizing a limited due process right to perform necessary
acts in the institutional context solves some of the problems created by the tension between the basic human needs of the institutionalized and the practical difficulties confronted by state
institutions. First, recognizing a right to perform necessary acts
places no significant corresponding obligations on state institutions. The right to claim necessity as a defense to a charge of
wrongdoing cannot be translated into a right to a given resource
that the state must provide. Necessity authorizes an individual to
act, but it imposes no concomitant, affirmative performance obligation on the state. Unlike the familiar, concrete rights to food,
shelter, and safety-typical of the due process cases-the
prisoner's right to perform necessary acts of survival does not
unduly burden the institution.
Second, recognizing the necessity defense in the prison context preserves to the institutionalized at least a baseline right to
survival. When the individual's survival is jeopardized, he is
allowed to act regardless of the institution's culpability or lack
thereof. Despite his institutionalization, he is not required to
submit to his own destruction. Thus, recognizing a limited necessity defense in the institutional context revitalizes at least the
core ideals articulated in DeShaney."'
Indeed, necessity has a long history in the institutional context, and in the prison context in particular. As early as 1736,
English courts had determined that prisoners escaping from
burning prisons could claim necessity as a defense: "[If a prison
be fired by accident, and there be a necessity to break prison to
save his life, this excuseth the felony."" In 1868, the Supreme
Court affirmed this principle in dictum, observing that "he is not
to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt."1 66 Courts
have since struggled to determine just what conditions really
make escape from state institutions and prisons necessary, 7

(cited in note 8); Kadish, 64 Cal L Rev at 888-89 (cite in note 132) (discussing the lesserevil theory of justification).
16 See DeShaney, 489 US at 199 ("IT]he state [must] ... ensure [institutionalized
persons'] 'reasonable safety' from themselves and others."), citing Youngberg, 457 US at
314-25.
" Levin, 18 Colum J L & Soc Probs at 515 (cited in note 20), quoting People v
Whipple, 100 Cal App 261, 279 P 1008, 1009 (1929), quoting Sir Matthew Hale, 1 History
of the Pleasof the Crown 611 (1736).
166 United States v Kirby, 74 US 482, 487 (1868).
" See, for example, People v Lovercamp, 43 Cal App 3d 823, 118 Cal Rptr 110, 111-16
(1974); People v Noble, 18 Mich App 300, 170 NW2d 916, 918 (1969); Whipple, 279 P at
1010; State v Cahill, 196 Iowa 486, 194 NW 190, 192 (1923); State v Davis, 14 Nev 439,
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but in the last twenty-five years, the basic right to necessary escape has been widely accepted. As the court wrote in People v
Lovercamp, the seminal prison escape case:
[W]e may assume that a prisoner with his back to the wall,
facing a gang of fellow-inmates approaching him with drawn
knives, who are making it very clear that they intend to kill
him, might be expected to go over the wall rather than remain and be a martyr to the principle of prison discipline ....168
Since Lovercamp, the majority of courts that have considered the
some form of necessity in the
issue have agreed that recognizing
169
appropriate.
is
context
prison
As suggested by its historical pedigree, necessity strikes a
workable balance between the needs of state institutions and the
rights of institutionalized individuals. Claims of necessity do not
burden state institutions by requiring them to reallocate precious
and scarce resources. Yet the right to claim necessity as a defense to a charge of wrongdoing vindicates the institutionalized
individual's right to act when the state fails to meet his basic
human needs. Thus, necessity solves the most problematic aspect
of the due process doctrine governing the rights of the institutionalized: it assures the survival of the institutionalized in the
face of good-faith institutional incapacity.
From this right to claim necessity in the institutional context
arises a prisoner's right to self-defense. Self-defense is, at bottom,
a variation on necessity. It can only be invoked when danger is
imminent, when no other alternative is available, and when the
state has failed to intervene.' ° When self-defense is invoked, it
is because violence is necessary to prevent worse or less-justified
violence. Self-defense claims will almost always satisfy the requirements of necessity claims.' 7 '

444 (1880). See also Levin, 18 Colum J L & Soc Probs at 514-22 (cited in note 20) (reviewing cases struggling with necessity in prison context).
"6 43 Cal App 3d 823, 118 Cal Rptr 110, 116 (1974). Significantly, the court noted
that it was not creating any new judicial doctrine: "We do not conceive that we have
created a new defense to an escape charge. We merely recognize, as did an English Court
238 years ago, that some conditions 'excuseth the felony.'" Id at 116.
2d 333, 362 NE2d 319, 320 (1977); People v
1"
See, for example, People v Unger, 66 Ill
Trujillo, 41 Colo App 223, 586 P2d 235, 236 (1978). See also Levin, 18 Colum J L & Soc
Probs at 520-22 (cited in note 20) (collecting cases).
,, See the definitions of the self-defense right in note 9.
17 Indeed, in the context of Lovercamp, recognizing a necessity-based right to selfdefense seems to avoid perverse results. If the state cannot require the prisoner to submit
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Thus, a prisoner's right to self-defense may be found at the
intersection of the due process rights of the institutionalized and
the law of necessity as it has developed in the institutional context. Courts reluctant to embrace the general right to self-defense
might still recognize this
suggested by the Palko analysis
more limited version, and thereby do justice to important due
process principles without unduly burdening state institutions. In
so doing, they would also avoid the disturbing outcome embraced
by Rowe.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If Dostoevsky is right that a society's prisons reflect that
society's degree of civilization, then the unrelenting violence that
makes the modern American prison such a dangerous place
should be cause for concern. And while economic and political
realities surely limit the resources available to the prison system,
and thus determine in large part the conditions that prevail
therein, the decision in Rowe illustrates that courts can and do
play a vital role in determining just how dangerous modern
American prisons are.
Rowe also illustrates the extent to which legal rhetoric disguises the role of the courts in shaping prison conditions. Despite
the availability of a spectrum of legal arguments supporting a
constitutional right to self-defense, the Rowe court embraced
pallid precedent and made not even passing reference to the rich
constitutional doctrines supporting more compassionate outcomes. As a result, a decision with cruel ramifications for prisoners was made to seem inevitable.
In fact, courts are entrusted with unusual responsibility in
shaping prison conditions doctrine. To a unique degree, prisoners
are excluded from the lawmaking process. They are pariahs,' 3
often disenfranchised, 7 4 and generally despised by much of the
to life-threatening violence, which version of prisoner self-help would it prefer--escape or
self-defense? To allow escape, but not self-defense, would appear to indicate a preference
for escape over self-defense within the confines of the prison walls. Clearly, escape seems
to pose more of a threat to prison security and the general welfare of society than does
allowing the prisoner to act in self-defense.
See text accompanying notes 107-08.
'
For a general discussion of the significance of minority and/or pariah status in constitutional theory, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrustchs 4-6 (Harvard 1980). See
also United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938).
" Prisoners are permanently disfranchised in fourteen states. Most other states
disfranchise prisoners for the duration of their stay in prison. See Andrew L. Shapiro,
Note, ChallengingCriminal Disfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strate-
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public. Politicians distance themselves from prisoner interests
and concerns, and often legislate by appealing to the fear, anger,
and hatred that broad constituencies feel toward imprisoned
criminals.'7 5 Prisoners disproportionately comprise racial and
socioeconomic minorities whose access to political representation
can already be tenuous. Thus, legislators and policymakers often
pay little heed to prisoners' needs.
As a result, the task of safeguarding prisoners' rights falls
uniquely to judges. As John Hart Ely has observed, judges have
heightened responsibilities where there is reason to fear that
"representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility.... "1 7 6 The Supreme Court has long recognized that cases
involving the rights of discrete and insular minorities warrant
special scrutiny. 77 Prisoners epitomize such a minority. Thus,
as Justice Brennan observed, courts have a unique role in protecting the rights of prisoners: 'Those whom we would banish
from society or from the human community itself often speak in
too faint a voice to be heard above society's demand for punishment. It is the particular role of courts to hear these voices .... ."'7 For prisoners, then, courts are a crucial check
against potential abuse in the democratic process. The responsibility for assuring that prisoners are treated in a civilized manner lies primarily with judges.
Courts should recognize the prisoner's constitutional right to
self-defense. Self-defense has been an indispensable element of
Anglo-American criminal justice, and it is therefore a fundamental right within the doctrine of due process. Furthermore, the
ideals of the law governing the due process rights of the institutionalized can best be realized by recognizing a necessity defense
in the institutional context-and this necessity defense likewise
provides a sound basis for a prisoner's right to self-defense.
The analysis in Rowe ignored both compassion and the Constitution. Prisoners in modern American prison are exposed to

gy, 103 Yale L J 537, 538-39 (1993); Alice E. Harvey, Note, Ex-Felon Disfranchisement
and Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U Pa L Rev 1145,
1146 (1994).
5 But see Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 152-54 (cited in note 173) (positing that
there may be "perfectly respectable reasons"-relating to differences among voters and
their interests-for the isolation of particular political groups).
Id at 103 (cited in note 173).
"
See, for example, Carolene Products, 304 US at 153 n 4.
178 McClesky v Kemp, 481 US 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan dissenting).
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tremendous violence, and Eighth Amendment doctrine offers
them little hope of protection. Even so, the Rowe court deprived
prisoners of their last line of defense on the basis of a shallow legal analysis, ignoring or failing to recognize constitutional doctrines supporting far more compassionate results. It may be true
that prisons are dangerous places, but, as Rowe illustrates, for
the modern American prisoner, courts can be dangerous places
too.

